In the canonical examples underlying Shafer-Dempster theory, beliefs over the hypotheses of interest are derived from a probability model for a set of auxiliary hypotheses.
Introduction
The artificial intelligence community is in the midst of a lively debate over the representation and manipulation of uncertainty.
There is a growing recognition of the need for a numerical uncertainty calculus for at least some classes of problems.
A glance through last year's proceedings for this workshop identifies two leading contenders for this role: probability theory and the Shafer-Dempster theory of belief func tions.
These two theories are closely related. Belief functions are based on probabilities, although common interpretations of beliefs as lower bounds on probabilities are easily shown to be incorrect.
The theory of belief functions lacks the axiomatic foundation of prob ability theory, but (not coincidentally) Shafer argues that such axiomatic justifications are unnecessary.
People do not come to a problem with beliefs "in their heads," waiting to be elicited.
Rather, argues Shafer, beliefs should be constructed in a process of comparing one's real-life problem to canonical examples of a theory. Bayesian theory, says Shafer, is based on canonical examples in which the truth is generated according to known chances.
In contrast, belief functions arise from canonical examples in which the meaning of the evidence is governed by chance. Choose the theory, says Shafer, for which the canonical examples best match your problem.
This constructive approach has obvious appeal, and has been advanced by Bayesian thinkers as well (e. g. Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaiffer, 1964) . With this approach, Bayesian theory is dethroned from a lofty (but undeserved) position:
there is no uniquely justifiable inference theory.
Bayesian theory applies only to the extent that the problem at hand "resembles" the theory's canonical examples.
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Yet the soundness of a constructive argument depends on more than whether a problem matches a theory's examples.
We also need a compell ing rationale for why the theory operates as it does on its canonical We shall see that belief function models are incompletely specified probability models, in which probabilities are specified for only some aspects of a problem (Shafer, 1984) . Belief function models are incoherent from the Bayesian perspective because we are not allowed to condition on that part of the evidence which is not modeled probabilistically.
On the other hand, coherence would require a willingness (at least in principle) to assign probabilities to any event, whether or not it makes sense to do so. The difference between the two approaches is made concrete by illustrating two situations which could never lead to the same probability model but which give rise to identical belief functions.
A Canonical Example
The story of the coded message is used repeatedly by Shafer as a canoni cal example. We begin with two (finite) sets, S and T, called "frames of discernment" by Shafer. The set T is the set of hypotheses of inter est to us. We may think of the "truth" teT as only partially observ able, in the sense that someone other than ourselves has ascertained that t lies in some subset�. We think of the subset A as a plaintext message, "the truth lies in A." The set S contains codes, or functions which carry plaintext messages A to some set Q (i.e., an element s of S is a function s: 2 T �). We do not get to observe A. Instead, a code s is chosen randomly according to a probability distribution P(·), and we receive the message q = s(A). For concreteness, let us consider
Example 1:
A spy is sent to discover whether the enemy intends to attack at dawn. The spy observes a non-empty subset of T -{yes, no} (i.e. she may observe A= {yes}, the enemy will attack; A {no}, the enemy will not attack; or A-T, she is unable to deter mine whether the enemy will attack).
The set of messages is Q The evidence consists of the probability distribution P(·) and a subset E of Sx 2 T which acts as a constraining relation:
if we learned which sES was chosen, we would know that t belonged to some subset �T for which (s,A)EE. In Example 1 , E = {(s 1 ,T), (s 2 ,{no})}.
A belief function on T is derived by extending the probability distribu tion P(·) to the power set 2 T .
Define s 1 = {s: (s,A)EE for some A} to be the set of those s which could have occurred given the evidence E.
Define C(s) = U{A: (s,A)EE} to be the set of those t compatible with s given E. A basic probability distribution is defined over 2 T by
The belief function is computed from the basic probability distribution by
Bel(A) I m(B) . ( 2 ) BcA
In Example 1 , C(s 1 ) = T and C(s 2 ) = {no}.
All codes are possible, so s 1 -S, and the basic probabilities are
Belief in an attack is Bel({yes}) = 0; belief in no attack is Bel({no}) -2 /3. To the extent that beliefs fail to sum to 1 , belief is not com mitted directly to singleton hypotheses (in this example, belief of 1 /3 is committed to T, but not allocated between its elements).
Thus, in the coded message example, the basic probability of a set A is determined by summing the probabilities for all those codes that decode to the set A, after first conditioning on the set of codes that are pos sible given the message q (this step ensures that basic probabilities sum to 1 ). Shafer regards it as intuitively clear that ( 2 ) defines reasonable degrees of belief for the coded message example. Bel(A) is "interpreted as the probability that the evidence means or implies" that tEA (in press, p. 3 1 ), and "m(A) is, in a certain sense, the total chance that the true message was A," ( 1 98 1 , p. 5) . This does not mean, he adds in a note, that A is drawn randomly from the distribution m(·): "It is just that m(A) is the sum of the chances for those codes that decode our encoded message to A." Despite this caveat, readers are likely to interpret m(A) as the (Bayesian) probability that the true message was A. We shall see later that this interpretation is wrong.
Dempster's Rule
The basic combination rule for belief functions has a natural inter pretation within the formalism of Shafer's canonical examples. Suppose S and U are two sets of codes, and codes sES and uEU are chosen indepen dently according to distributions P(·) and R(·), respectively. We ob serve coded messages q 1 = s(A 1 ) and q 2 = u(A 2 ), where A 1 and A 2 are the contents of the true plaintext messages. We now have two constraining
relations, E 1 = {(s,A 1 ): s(A 1 )=q 1 } and E 2 = {(u,A 2 ): u(A 2 )=q 2 }. We may combine these into a single set E as follows. Suppose (s,A 1 ) and (u,A 2 ) are the true codes and plaintext messages.
This means that the truth t is constrained to lie in both A 1 and A 2 , that is, in their intersection A=A 1 nA 2 .
Ruling out impossible combinations, we obtain a combined con straining relationE = {(s,u,A) : �. A=A 1 nA 2 , s(A 1 )=q 1 , u(A 2 )=q 2 }. The probability distribution over SxU is given by the product distribution Pr(s,u) = P(s) ·R(u) (because the codes were chosen independently) , and extended to a belief function exactly as before. The set su1 is defined as {(s,u) :(s,u,A) E E for some A}, the set of codes compatible with E. The set C(s,u) is defined as U{A: (s,u,A) E E}, the set of t compatible with codes s and u. Then
Conditioning on the set su1 of compatible codes is the usual normaliza tion step of Dempster's Ru l e. The belief function then comes from (2) .
4.
Belief Functions and Bayesian Probabilities Equation (4) makes it clear that both the construction of belief func tions from Shafer's canonical examples and the application of Dempster's Rule follow from the framework outlined in Section 2. The basic ele ments are (i) two frames S [S xU in (4) ] and T; and (ii) evidence con sisting of a probability distribution on S and a constraining relation E which specifies which subsets of T are compatible with each se S. No probabilities are defined over T. To derive degrees of belief over T, we first form a conditional probability distribution over S, ruling out elements incompatible with the evidence E. We then compute the degree of belief in A by summing the conditional probabilities for s such that A contains the set C(s) of t compatible with s.
Shafer (in press) argues that this extension of the distribution P(·) to Bel(·) is entirely natural when S "mediates the interaction" between the evidence and T. This means, he says, that "the evidence bears on the question considered by T only indirectly, through its relevance to the question considered by S. "
That this is the case in the coded message example is regarded by Shafer as obvious.
To a Bayesian, this is a curious argument: the set E gives information jointly about S and T.
Suppose, prior to observing the message q, we had placed a distribution over the possible plaintext messages A. As sume the codes are chosen independently of the plaintext message A (a clear implication of the sense of the example) .
If the codes are one to-one (i. e. a single A compatible with each s given the message q) , then it can be shown that m(A) is the posterior probability of A given E, if all A were a priori equally likely (Williams, 1982) .
Otherwise, the interpretation of m(A) as the posterior probability of A is er roneous. Because E contains information about both the code s and the plaintext message A, the posterior probabilities depend on both the probabilities P(·) over S and the prior probabilities of subsets Ac T.
The result cited above means that a belief function model for the coded message example with one-to-one codes is mathematically equivalent to a Bayesian model in which plaintext messages A are assigned equal prior probabilities, and m(A) is the posterior probability of A given E. Despite this formal equivalence, Shafer argues that belief function models are not Bayesian--"they have their own logic. " The Bayesian ar gument applies only when we think it appropriate to assign probabilities to the plaintext messages.
If, on the other hand, it seems appropriate to attach probabilities to the codes but not to the plaintext messages or to teT, then we should use the probabilities over S to define beliefs for T as in (1) and (2). We condition only on those aspects of the evidence for which we have specified a probability model.
To a Bayesian, it would always be possible in principle to put probabil ities on the plaintext messages. If these probabilities are not specified, the Bayesian would either assign them by assumption (e.g., Laskey et al. , 1986) or produce an analysis of how the posterior prob abilities would depend on the priors if they were specified. Let us try such an analysis for Example 1. The posterior probability of {yes} is always 0; if the prior probabilities of {no} and T are in ratio a:l, their posterior probabilities are in ratio Pr(A={no}I E) Pr(A= T I E) Pr(A={no}; E) Pr(A= T;E) 2a 1
Pr(s 2 ,{no})
A ratio of 2:1, as in the Shaferian belief function, means to a Bayesian an implicit assumption of a-1, or equal prior probabilities.
On reflection, Equation (5) , a special case of Williams' result, should not seem surprising. A Bayesian model of the coded message problem requires a complete probability model over Sx2 T . Our model was based on two assumptions, both of which seem to arise naturally from the sense of the example. The first is that the codes are chosen independently of the plaintext message (the spy's actual observation) . The second as sumption is that the codes a r e chosen at random with prior probability (i.e. before conditioning on the content of the coded message) P(·) . For the Bayesian posterior probability to match the belief function, we would need a third requirement: that the posterior probability of each plaintext message given the observed message BANANA is equal to the prior probability of the code transforming the plaintext message into the message BANANA. It is not surprising that this third condition holds only when the prior odds ratio is equal to 1.
But Shafer clearly does not intend the basic probability of a set to be the posterior probability given E that it was the true plaintext mes sage. Rather, as discussed above, a belief function is an incompletely specified probability model. Probabilities are specified for the codes, but no probability model is given for T, either unconditionally or con ditional on the codes in S. Since there is no joint distribution over Sx2 T , we may not condition on the full evidence E. Rather, we condition the distribution over S on the set s 1 of codes which could have occurred given the message q. Shafer defends this as an intuitively plausible way to assign beliefs when no probability model is given for T or its relation to S.
We see, then, that a Bayesian and a Shaferian would operate differently on Shafer's own canonical example. Given a partially specified prob ability model, the Shaferian adopts a partial conditioning approach that avoids the issue of probabilities on plaintext messages. The Bayesian regards the Shaferian's results as implicitly determining probabilities on the plaintext messages. Dempster's Rule follows from Shaferian par tial conditioning ; to a Bayesian, it requires implicit but untenable as sumptions (equal prior probabilities on the component plaintext messages; and that learning one plaintext message A 1 tells us nothing about the other plaintext message A 2 ).
5.
A Second Example
We have established that belief functions are not Bayesian. Our second example shows why it matters: the example results in the identical belief function as Example 1, but the Bayesian posterior probabilities must be different.
The same spy as in Example 1 observes the same plain text message, and again sends a message using one of two possible codes. The first code of Example 1 is replaced by a new code that distinguishes only between confirmation and nonconfirmation of the attack; the second code is left unchanged. The codes are:
The probabilities of the codes are the same as in Example 1: P(s 1 ) 1/3 and P(s 2 ) -2/3.
In this example, the constraining relation is given byE' -((s 1 ' ,(no}) , (s 1 ' ,T), (s 2 ,(no}) }. The compatibility sets, however, are the same as in Example 1: C(s 1 ') -T and C(s 2 )-{no}. Thus, the basic probability assignments (3) apply to this example, and belief in no attack is again 2/3. 
In other words, in Example 1, learning that the message was BANANA mul tiplies by a factor of 2 the prior odds ratio for plaintext message {no} versus T. In Example 2, the prior odds ratio is multiplied by 3. Regardless of prior probability, no Bayesian would assign equal beliefs in these two examples, yet the resulting belief functions are identical.
Example 2 differs from the examples used by Shafer in that there is no unique decoding of the code s 1 '.
But to disallow the example by Shafer's criterion, we would have to argue that S' does not mediate the interaction between the coded message and T.
Yet in Example 1 it is supposed to be clear that the observed message does bear on T only through its relevance to which code in S ws chosen. This argument would not seem to be affected by the double assignment of the codeword BANANA in Example 2. A Shaferian would argue differently.
In both examples, the second code implies that the enemy will not attack. In neither example does the first code imply anything about the enemy's intention (while the spy could have observed {no} in Example 2, she could also have observed T).
Therefore, our belief in no attack should be equal to the probability of the second code, and our uncommitted belief should be equal to the prob ability of the first code.
Which analysis is "correct?" The answer to this question goes to the heart of the philosophical debate between Bayesians and Shaferians. To a Bayesian, even when a probability model is left unspecified, implica tions of such a model if it were specified should be preserved. To a Shaferian, if it makes no sense to specify a probability model for part of a problem, there is no reason to be bound by the implications of such a model.
If you accept equal beliefs for Examples 1 and 2, then you probably ac cept (1) and (2) as reasonable formulae for deriving beliefs on a frame
T from probabilities on a related frame S. Since Dempster's Rule fol lows from (1) and (2), you should accept that also.
If, on the other hand, you feel that belief in no attack should be higher for Example 2, then you disagree with how beliefs are assigned for the canonical ex amples Shafer uses to justify his theory. In complex problems, this foundational disagreement may have implications that are not so clear as in the simple example of this paper.
